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OUR PROUDEST BOAST
Wyatt Kozinski*
It took eighty-eight years to return to an old but proud principle of free speech law,
one that was first announced in a little remembered dissent by Justice Oliver Wendell
Holmes. That principle recently found noteworthy expression in Justice Samuel Alito’s
opinion in Matal v. Tam (2017). For it was in that case that the Court harkened back to
Justice Holmes’s dissent in United States v. Schwimmer (1929). This was Holmes’s last
free speech opinion. Notably, it was not a constitutional case, but rather a case involving
an immigrant. Yet Holmes took the occasion to announce a broad new principle that
would, in time, blossom into a major tenet of our free speech jurisprudence – the need to
protect the speech we hate. According to Holmes, this principle is not limited to citizens
but applies to all those living in the United States. Holmes managed to do all this in 634
scant words. There is evidence that Brandeis played a role in spurring Holmes to write
this dissent. But the circumstances of Holmes’s life—the loss of his wife, the realization
that his long career and life were coming to an end—also helped shape an opinion that is
the antithesis of the values Holmes championed as a Justice: judicial restraint, a valueneutral jurisprudence, and personal detachment from the facts of his cases and the people
whose lives they affected. Schwimmer was the one case where Holmes showed a touch of
humanity that was otherwise absent from his judicial work. The Supreme Court eventually
adopted Holmes’s Schwimmer dissent in Girouard v. United States (1946). But there is
much more, namely, the evolution of an idea, magnificently expressed, that nine decades
later is hailed by the Supreme Court as “the proudest boast of our free speech
jurisprudence.”
INTRODUCTION
Near the end of the last Term, the Supreme Court rendered its opinion in what is
destined to become a landmark case, Matal v. Tam.1 In sustaining a First Amendment
challenge to the disparagement clause of the Lanham Act, the majority, per Justice Samuel
Alito, reaffirmed a core principle of First Amendment law:
But no matter how the point is phrased, [the Petitioner’s] unmistakable thrust is
this: The Government has an interest in preventing speech expressing ideas that
offend. And, as we have explained, that idea strikes at the heart of the First
* This Essay benefitted greatly from the advice of Professor G. Edward White of the University of Virginia
Law School and Professor Ronald K. L. Collins of the University of Washington Law School.
1. 137 S. Ct. 1744 (2017).
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Amendment. Speech that demeans on the basis of race, ethnicity, gender, religion,
age, disability, or any other similar ground is hateful; but the proudest boast of our
free speech jurisprudence is that we protect the freedom to express “the thought
that we hate.” United States v. Schwimmer, 279 U.S. 644, 655 (1929) (Holmes, J.,
dissenting).2
What is especially noteworthy about this principle – protecting the thought that we hate –
is that Holmes announced it in a dissent that was not among his more famous ones. 3 For
that matter, it was not even a First Amendment case. Penned when he was eighty-eight
and fading, Holmes had little reason to believe that his Schwimmer dissent would ever
draw more than scant attention compared to his memorable First Amendment opinions.
But in Schwimmer, as in those cases, Holmes knew how to capture an idea and then encase
it in rhetoric that would stand the test of time. The principle undergirding that dissent
would, to paraphrase Justice Alito, become our proudest boast.
Oliver Wendell Holmes is a towering figure in American law—deified by some,4
reviled by others,5 and the subject of a large body of scholarly work that is positive but
not uncritical.6 Despite such widespread exploration, Holmes’s views on many subjects
have remained opaque, due in large part to “[t]he capacity of his thought to contain diverse
and self-opposing points of view, the elusiveness of his ideas, [and] the hints in his
personal life that his temperament was layered and complicated . . . .”7 In a field rich with
scholarly thought, this Essay sets out to shed some light on Justice Holmes’s last opinion
dealing with free speech, namely his dissent in United States v. Schwimmer,8 and how that
2. Id. at 1764 (emphasis added).
3. Anthony Lewis did, however, title a book after it. See ANTHONY LEWIS, FREEDOM FOR THE THOUGHT
THAT WE HATE: A BIOGRAPHY OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT (2007).
4. Benjamin Cardozo, who succeeded Holmes as Supreme Court Justice, called him “the great overlord of
the law and its philosophy.” Benjamin N. Cardozo, Mr. Justice Holmes, 44 HARV. L. REV. 682, 691 (1931).
According to Cardozo, Holmes “is today for all students . . . of human society the philosopher and the seer, the
greatest of our age in the domain of jurisprudence . . . .” Id. at 684. Cardozo’s successor, Felix Frankfurter, did
him one better: “He is, indeed, philosopher become king.” FELIX FRANKFURTER, MR. JUSTICE HOLMES AND THE
CONSTITUTION 8 (1927). Eight years later, Frankfurter added that “For centuries . . . men who never heard of
him will be moving to the measure of his thought.” Felix Frankfurter, Mr. Justice Holmes, 48 HARV. L. REV.
1279, 1280 (1935). Two decades later, U.S. District Judge Charles Wyzanski rhapsodized Holmes as being “like
the Winged Victory of Samothrace . . . the summit of hundreds of years of civilization . . . .” Charles E.
Wyzanski, Jr., The Democracy of Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, 7 VAND. L. REV. 311, 323 (1954). Four decades
later still, Judge Posner described Holmes as “the most illustrious figure in the history of American Law.” Richard
A. Posner, Introduction to THE ESSENTIAL HOLMES: SELECTIONS FROM THE LETTERS, SPEECHES, JUDICIAL
OPINIONS, AND OTHER WRITINGS OF OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., at ix (Richard A. Posner ed.,1992). To be
sure, much more could be added.
5. See, e.g., ALBERT W. ALSCHULER, LAW WITHOUT VALUES: THE LIFE, WORK, AND LEGACY OF JUSTICE
HOLMES (2000). Professor Alschuler lists a number of largely forgotten Holmes skeptics, such as Mortimer
Adler, H. L. Mencken, Yosal Rogat, Saul Touster, and Edmund Wilson. Id. at 10 & nn.62–67.
6. See, e.g., SHELDON M. NOVICK, HONORABLE JUSTICE: THE LIFE OF OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES (1989);
LIVA BAKER, THE JUSTICE FROM BEACON HILL: THE LIFE AND TIMES OF OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES (1991); G.
EDWARD WHITE, JUSTICE OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES: LAW AND THE INNER SELF (1993) [hereinafter WHITE,
LAW AND THE INNER SELF]. See also the large body of work listed by Professor Alschuler in LAW WITHOUT
VALUES, supra note 5, at 200–02 & n.61.
7. WHITE, LAW AND THE INNER SELF, supra note 6, at 4. As Professor White observes, “the ubiquity of
Holmes’ language and his capacity to take on multiple symbolic roles . . . appear to ensure that his ‘core’ is
unlikely to come to rest, as successive waves of observers reconfigure his image in accordance with their own
presuppositions.” Id.
8. 279 U.S. 644 (1929). Later, in Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931), Holmes joined the majority in
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opinion, nearly nine decades later, shaped our modern free speech jurisprudence.
SCHWIMMER: A FREE SPEECH CASE THAT WAS NOT A FIRST AMENDMENT CASE
Schwimmer was not a First Amendment case, or a constitutional case of any sort.
This is because Rosika Schwimmer was not a U.S. citizen; she was a Hungarian national.
She had been living in the United States for some years and decided to abandon her
Hungarian citizenship9 and apply for U.S. citizenship. Her loyalty to the United States and
its form of government was not in doubt. She was otherwise qualified for citizenship but
for her refusal to answer in the affirmative the following question: “If necessary, are you
willing to take up arms in defense of this country?”10 To that question, she answered: “I
would not take up arms personally.” 11 A self-proclaimed “uncompromising pacifist,”12
Schwimmer explained that she
found the United States nearest her ideals of a democratic republic, and that she
could whole-heartedly take the oath of allegiance. . . . For the fulfillment of the duty
to support and defend the Constitution and laws, she had in mind other ways and
means. She referred to her interest in civic life, to her wide reading and attendance
at lectures and meetings, mentioned her knowledge of foreign languages, . . . and
she would conceive it her duty to uphold [the American form of government against
attacks in foreign-language publications].13
The district court denied Schwimmer’s application but the Seventh Circuit reversed,
reasoning quite sensibly that a fifty-year-old woman would never be called upon to serve
in the armed forces, so her unwillingness to do so was immaterial to her suitability for
citizenship.14
After Olive Rabe15 argued on behalf of Rosika Schwimmer, the Supreme Court
reversed the Seventh Circuit. Justice Pierce Butler authored the majority opinion, writing
for himself and five other Justices. According to the majority, Schwimmer had failed to
show
that her pacifism and lack of nationalistic sense did not oppose the principle that it
is a duty of citizenship by force of arms when necessary to defend the country
against all enemies, and that her opinions and beliefs would not prevent or impair
upholding a First Amendment free speech claim.
9. Letter from Rosika Schwimmer to Oliver Wendell Holmes 2 (Jan. 28, 1930), available at
https://iiif.lib.harvard.edu/manifests/view/drs:37509894$1i (“A person born into the wrong family—and
choosing another wrong one when chance permits the selection of a new family—that seemed to be my foolish
position.”). Schwimmer is here using “family” as a synecdoche for “country” or “nation.”
10. Schwimmer, 279 U.S. at 647 (“The Naturalization Act of June 29, 1906, requires: ‘He (the applicant for
naturalization) shall, before he is admitted to citizenship, declare on oath in open court . . . that he will support
and defend the Constitution and laws of the United States against all enemies, foreign and domestic, and bear
true faith and allegiance to the same.’”).
11. Id.
12. Id. at 648.
13. Id. at 647.
14. Schwimmer v. United States, 27 F.2d 742, 744 (7th Cir. 1928).
15. See Ronald K. L. Collins & David L. Hudson Jr., Remembering Two Forgotten Women in Free Speech
History, First Amend. Ctr. (May 27, 2008), http://www.firstamendmentcenter.org/remembering-2-forgottenwomen-in-free-speech-history; Jane Dall Wilson, Looking Back . . . The Advocacy of Olive Rabe in Schwimmer
v. United States, CIRCUIT RIDER, April 2013, at 38.
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the true faith and allegiance required by the act. 16
That Schwimmer was too old and the wrong sex under the then-applicable conscription
law was of no consequence to the majority because “the word [pacifism] is also used and
understood to mean one who refuses [to take up arms] . . . and who is disposed to
encourage others in such refusal.”17
As the majority viewed it, “her testimony clearly suggests that she is disposed to
exert her power to influence others to such opposition.” 18 In other words, the majority
suggested that Schwimmer might encourage others to resist the draft, making a tacit
allusion to Schenck v. United States,19 in which Holmes, writing for the Court a decade
earlier, affirmed the conviction of a World War I draft protester—an opinion that Holmes’s
Schwimmer dissent is at pains to distinguish. In essence, the majority was saying that
American pacifists caused trouble by persuading conscripted soldiers not to report for duty
during the Great War, so there was good reason to avoid swelling their numbers by
granting citizenship—and its concomitant constitutional rights—to someone who might
engage in similarly subversive activities in case of another war. Given that World War II
would erupt a scant decade later, and interwar Europe was far from politically stable, the
majority’s concerns hardly seemed fanciful.
Holmes’s answer to the majority begins weakly:
Of course the fear is that if a war came the applicant would exert activities such as
were dealt with in Schenck v. United States . . . . But that seems to me unfounded.
Her position and motives are wholly different from those of [Charles] Schenck. She
is an optimist and states in strong and, I do not doubt, sincere words her belief that
war will disappear and that the impending destiny of mankind is to unite in peaceful
leagues.20
Phrased differently, Holmes rejects the district court’s finding that Schwimmer posed the
same risk as Schenck in case of war. Given Holmes’s track record of giving great—almost
blind—deference to the findings of the trier of fact,21 this ex cathedra pronouncement
about Schwimmer’s motives and likely future conduct is a remarkable departure.
These statements are best read as a rhetorical springboard for Holmes’s broader
objection to the Government’s effort to penalize Schwimmer for mere opinion
unconnected to concrete action, and he does so in resounding terms that only he among
the Justices could muster:
Some of her answers might excite popular prejudice, but if there is any principle of
the Constitution that more imperatively calls for attachment than any other it is the
principle of free thought—not free thought for those who agree with us but freedom
for the thought that we hate. I think that we should adhere to that principle with

16. Schwimmer, 279 U.S. at 653.
17. Id. at 652 (emphasis added).
18. Id.
19. 249 U.S. 47 (1919) (affirming defendant’s conviction for distributing leaflets criticizing conscription
during World War I and holding that the Espionage Act of 1917 did not violate the First Amendment).
20. Schwimmer, 279 U.S. at 654.
21. See discussion infra 531–32.
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regard to admission into, as well as to life within this country.22
Here Holmes takes a giant leap by introducing three ground-breaking concepts. The
first is that the Constitution has anything at all to say about the treatment of aliens—a view
he had in the past rejected most vigorously.23 Second is the assertion that the Constitution
guarantees freedom of thought—a right nowhere mentioned. This, too, seems to contradict
decades of Holmesian jurisprudence—slavishly deferential to majoritarian will 24 and
highly suspicious of efforts to find rights not enumerated in the Constitution. Holmes may
have thought of himself as what we might today call a strict constructionist, perhaps even
an originalist—although he would surely have bristled at any such labels. 25 Finally, and
perhaps most remarkable, Holmes announces what might best be described as a metaconstitutional rule—a rule “that more imperatively calls for attachment than any other” 26
in the Constitution. Was this just rhetorical flourish, or did Holmes mean to say that the
Constitution embodies a hierarchy of values, some more important than others? For a
Justice who had for decades derided the value of values,27 this would be a major departure
indeed.
The balance of this Essay will consider what may have prompted Holmes to write
these brief but powerful sentences, and what he may have sought to accomplish with them.
But in order to do so, it is necessary to have some understanding of Holmes’s preSchwimmer jurisprudence. The next section gives an overview of this, with particular
emphasis on his somewhat mixed record in First Amendment cases.
THE YANKEE FROM OLYMPUS28
During his long life, Holmes served half a century as a Justice—two decades on the

22. Schwimmer, 279 U.S. at 654–55.
23. Professor Collins notes that “[i]n the past Holmes had been remarkably deferential to the power of the
United States to treat aliens as lacking constitutional rights.” THE FUNDAMENTAL HOLMES: A FREE SPEECH
CHRONICLE AND READER 340 (Ronald K. L. Collins ed., 2010) [hereinafter THE FUNDAMENTAL HOLMES].
Writing for the Court in Tiaco v. Forbes, 228 U.S. 549, 556–57 (1913), Holmes stated: “It is admitted that
sovereign states have inherent power to deport aliens, and seemingly that Congress is not deprived of this power
by the Constitution of the United States.”
24. This attitude is perhaps best summarized in Holmes’s own words: “[I]f my fellow citizens want to go to
Hell I will help them. It’s my job.” Letter from Oliver Wendell Holmes to Harold J. Laski (Mar. 4, 1920), in 1
HOLMES-LASKI LETTERS: THE CORRESPONDENCE OF MR. JUSTICE HOLMES AND HAROLD J. LASKI 249 (Mark
DeWolfe Howe ed., 1953) [hereinafter HOLMES-LASKI LETTERS].
25. In a letter to Laski, commenting on Schwimmer’s pacifism, Holmes commented, “All ‘isms seem to me
silly . . . .” Letter from Oliver Wendell Holmes to Harold J. Laski (Apr. 13, 1929), in 2 HOLMES-LASKI LETTERS,
supra note 24, at 1146.
26. Schwimmer, 279 U.S. at 655.
27. Professor Alschuler wrote an entire book criticizing Holmes for his disdain for values. See ALSCHULER,
supra note 5. Holmes seems to have had values when he was a young man, enlisting in the army during the Civil
War because of his strong abolitionist beliefs. THE FUNDAMENTAL HOLMES, supra note 23, at 4–5. Seeing the
ravages of war, and being wounded three times, appears to have cured Holmes of his idealism. Id. at 7.
Eventually, he ceased to believe that anything was provable. According to Professor Rogat, “it is well known
that he claimed to have difficulty even with the ‘truth’ of the sum of two and two.” Yosal Rogat & James M.
O’Fallon, Mr. Justice Holmes: A Dissenting Opinion—The Speech Cases, 36 STAN. L. REV. 1349, 1372 (1984).
28. See CATHERINE DRINKER BOWEN, YANKEE FROM OLYMPUS: JUSTICE HOLMES AND HIS FAMILY (1944).
Bowen wrote “a flattering, fictionalized bestseller” based “on the personal reminiscences of relatives and law
clerks,” reportedly because she was refused access to the Holmes papers by Harvard Law School. ALSCHULER,
supra note 5, at 32.
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Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts and three decades more on the United States
Supreme Court. During that time, he developed a judicial philosophy that called for courts
to exercise great restraint in reversing the will of political majorities. As Professor White
described it:
To some extent courts were bound by the choices of their predecessors; it was not
generally the province of judges to “undertake to renovate the law.” Even on those
occasions when precedents gave no guidelines, a series of institutional constraints
derived from Holmes’s notion of majoritarian sovereignty limited judicial freedom.
The judiciary, not being elected representatives of the majority, was [not] to
substitute its views for those of legislatures. The judiciary did not necessarily
protect even constitutional rights against legislative infringement. All individual
rights, for Holmes, were ultimately held at majority sufferance. 29
Holmes’s most famous articulation of this principle was his forceful dissent in
Lochner v. New York, wherein he stated: “I think that the word ‘liberty,’ in the [Fourteenth]
Amendment, is perverted when it is held to prevent the natural outcome of a dominant
opinion, unless it can be said that a rational and fair man necessarily would admit that the
statute proposed would infringe fundamental principles as they have been understood by
the traditions of our people and our law.” 30 Holmes’s Lochner dissent was emblematic of
his philosophy: “He has always been prone to sustain legislation where it was not clearly
unconstitutional.”31
Moreover, Holmes believed that a reviewing court was subject to an additional
constraint, namely the findings of the trier of fact, and he exhibited such deference in a
trilogy of First Amendment cases in the spring of 1919: Schenck v. United States,32
Frohwerk v. United States,33 and Debs v. United States.34 These cases were brought by
the Government under the Espionage Act of 1917 against individuals who spoke out
against the participation of the United States in World War I. The Supreme Court
unanimously affirmed convictions in all three cases. In Schenck, Holmes announced the
“clear and present danger” test, which we have come to understand as a highly speechprotective doctrine, but “it is hard to see how a clear and present danger test of any
substance was there applied.”35 Indeed, “much of the language in Schenck is simply
inconsistent with any satisfactory protection of speech.” 36 Debs was equally problematic;
it embodied “the dead opposite of any significant clear and present danger doctrine.”37
Frohwerk, which relied on Schenck, involved the publication of a newspaper titled the
Missouri Staats Zeitung. There was no indication that the paper’s editorials were directed
29. G. EDWARD WHITE, THE AMERICAN JUDICIAL TRADITION: PROFILES OF LEADING AMERICAN JUDGES
134 (3d ed. 2007) [hereinafter WHITE, AMERICAN JUDICIAL TRADITION] (quoting Oliver Wendell Holmes, Law
in Science and Science in Law, 12 HARV. L. REV. 443, 460 (1899)).
30. 198 U.S. 45, 76 (1905).
31. WHITE, LAW AND THE INNER SELF, supra note 6, at 369 (quoting Charles E. Carpenter, Oliver Wendell
Holmes, Jurist, 8 ORE. L. REV. 269, 270 (1929)).
32. 249 U.S. 47 (1919).
33. 249 U.S. 204 (1919).
34. 249 U.S. 211 (1919).
35. Rogat & O’Fallon, supra note 27, at 1371.
36. Id. at 1370.
37. Id. at 1375.
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to individuals involved in the war effort or to those who had been conscripted for service
in the military (as was the case in Schenck). Thus, the evidence that the editorials presented
a danger at all, much less a clear and present one, was scant. Nevertheless, Holmes
affirmed the conviction in a passage that demonstrates the extreme deference he was
willing to accord jury verdicts:
But we must take the case on the record as it is, and on that record it is impossible
to say that it might not have been found that the circulation of the paper was in
quarters where a little breath would be enough to kindle a flame and that the fact
was known and relied upon by those who sent the paper out.38
These three cases illustrate Holmes’s early insensitivity to free speech. While
Holmes is widely celebrated today as the father of the modern First Amendment, 39 he
came to that view late in his career. Holmes treated the trilogy of speech cases decided in
the spring of 1919 as nothing more than “routine criminal appeal[s].” 40 While Schenck
announced the “clear and present danger” test, Professor White notes that “Schenck,
Frohwerk, and Debs, taken together, suggest that Holmes’ ‘clear and present danger’ test
was simply a restatement of ‘attempts’ language found in his earlier opinions . . . [and] did
not significantly modify his earlier free speech jurisprudence.”41 To much the same effect,
Professor Thomas Healy has noted: “In short, Holmes was in many ways the justice least
likely to stick his neck out for the right of free speech – and for the Court’s role in enforcing
that right.”42 Holmes had not yet begun to use the First Amendment as a tool for protecting
those who spoke out against the government.
That evolution came in the following Term when he filed his justly celebrated
dissent in Abrams v. United States.43 In Abrams, the Government prosecuted war
protesters, this time under the Sedition Act of 1918, for tossing from the roof of a hat
factory some 5000 leaflets calling for a general strike to protest U.S. operations in Russia.
The Government claimed—and a jury found—that this was intended to impair the U.S.
war effort against Germany. The Supreme Court affirmed, employing much the same
reasoning that Holmes had employed in Schenck, Frohwerk, and Debs.44 Holmes
dissented in sonorous language that set the terms for our modern interpretation of the First
Amendment. And once he unlocked that door, Holmes stepped through it body and soul.
As Professor White notes, “[i]n only one free speech case after Abrams did Holmes fail to
38. Frohwerk, 249 U.S. at 209.
39. See, e.g., THE FUNDAMENTAL HOLMES, supra note 23, at xiii.
40. See Harry Kalven, Professor Ernst and Debs v. United States, 40 U. CHI. L. REV. 235, 238 (1973).
Professor Kalven was there referring only to Debs but, as Professor Rogat points out, the same “was true of all
these cases.” Rogat & O’Fallon, supra note 27, at 1378.
41. WHITE, LAW AND THE INNER SELF, supra note 6, at 420. Holmes’s insensitivity to free speech issues
dates back to his days on the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts where he famously said: “The petitioner
may have a constitutional right to talk politics, but he has no constitutional right to be a policeman.” McAuliffe
v. Mayor of New Bedford, 29 N.E. 517, 517–18 (1892). See also Commonwealth v. Davis, 39 N.E. 113 (1895)
(upholding conviction for speaking on the Boston Commons on the theory that the state could limit speech at
will in a public park it owns).
42. THOMAS HEALY, THE GREAT DISSENT: HOW OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES CHANGED HIS MIND – AND
CHANGED THE HISTORY OF FREE SPEECH IN AMERICA 6–7 (2013).
43. 250 U.S. 616 (1919). See HEALY, supra note 42, at 4–8.
44. Id. at 623 (“[T]he plain purpose of their propaganda was to excite, at the supreme crisis of the war,
disaffection, sedition, riots, and, as they hoped, revolution, in this country.”).
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adopt a position in support of speech rights.” 45
Much has been written about Holmes’s Abrams dissent and his subsequent pro-First
Amendment jurisprudence.46 It will not be rehearsed here, as it is far beyond the scope of
this Essay. What I do wish to consider are some of the reasons Holmes might have had for
changing positions, as those reasons might bear directly on why Holmes chose to write as
he did in Schwimmer.47 In his personal correspondence, Holmes repeatedly complains
about letters protesting his opinion in Debs: “Just now I am receiving some singularly
ignorant protests against a decision that I wrote sustaining a conviction of Debs, a labor
agitator . . . .”48 And further, more testily: “I am beginning to get stupid letters of protest
against a decision that Debs, a noted agitator, was rightly convicted . . . .”49
There was also considerable academic criticism. Professor Ernst Freund wrote a
sharply critical article in The New Republic,50 which Holmes took so seriously that he
drafted (but never sent) a letter to Herbert Croly, editor of The New Republic, defending
his opinion.51 Moreover, Holmes was the object of private criticism and pressure on
account of Debs in particular. According to Professor Rogat, “[Zechariah] Chafee, . . . at
a tea arranged by Harold Laski, may have convinced Holmes of the need for more stringent
protection of speech. It may also be that Holmes was moved by finding among the ‘fools
and knaves’ who took issue with Debs many of the young men whose friendship and
respect he greatly valued.”52
Respect and admiration were precisely what Holmes craved his entire career and,
despite the many outward signs that he achieved it, he remained insecure and
dissatisfied.53 In Holmes’s “Life Plan”: Confronting Ambition, Passion, and
Powerlessness,54 Professor White refers to “Holmes’s ambivalent reception of his
45. WHITE, LAW AND THE INNER SELF, supra note 6, at 445. The single subsequent case where Holmes did
not come out on the side of free speech was Gilbert v. Minnesota, 254 U.S. 325 (1920), where he concurred in
the result without explanation. His disagreement with Brandeis’s free speech-protective dissent might thus have
been procedural rather than substantive, namely, the application of the First Amendment to the states. See id. at
336 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
46. See, e.g., RICHARD POLENBERG, FIGHTING FAITHS: THE ABRAMS CASE, THE SUPREME COURT, AND FREE
SPEECH (1987); GEOFFREY STONE, PERILOUS TIMES: FREE SPEECH IN WARTIME 203–11 (2004).
47. Most commentators agree that Abrams and subsequent Holmes opinions cannot be reconciled with his
earlier speech cases. But it does not appear that Holmes himself ever recognized he had changed his position. In
his Abrams dissent Holmes insisted, “I never have seen any reason to doubt that the questions of law that alone
were before this Court in the Cases of Schenck, Frohwerk, and Debs were rightly decided.” Abrams, 250 U.S. at
627 (citations omitted).
48. Letter from Oliver Wendell Holmes to Lewis Einstein (Apr. 5, 1919), in THE HOLMES-EINSTEIN
LETTERS: CORRESPONDENCE OF MR. JUSTICE HOLMES AND LEWIS EINSTEIN 1903–1935, at 184 (James Bishop
Peabody ed., 1964).
49. Letter from Oliver Wendell Holmes to Frederick Pollock (Apr. 5, 1919), in HOLMES-POLLOCK LETTERS:
THE CORRESPONDENCE OF MR. JUSTICE HOLMES AND SIR FREDERICK POLLOCK, 1874–1932, at 7–8 (Mark
DeWolfe Howe ed., 1941).
50. Ernst Freund, The Debs Case and Freedom of Speech, NEW REPUBLIC, May 13, 1919, at 13.
51. We know about the letter to Croly because Holmes enclosed the draft in a letter to Harold Laski with the
comment that he thought Freund’s article “was poor stuff.” Letter from Oliver Wendell Holmes to Harold J.
Laski (May 13, 1919), in 1 HOLMES-LASKI LETTERS, supra note 24, at 202–04.
52. Rogat & O’Fallon, supra note 27, at 1378.
53. WHITE, LAW AND THE INNER SELF, supra note 6, at 369–71. See also id. at 476 (“Ambition also fostered
Holmes’ singular competitiveness, his extreme sensitivity to criticism, his thirst for recognition, . . . and his
insatiable desire for an even higher level of accomplishment.”).
54. 65 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1409 (1990) [hereinafter White, Holmes’s Life Plan].
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canonization.”55 This was based on Holmes’s grave concern that, with advancing age and
eventual retirement and death, his reputation and the influence of his legal thinking would
be lost and he would slide into obscurity. His friendships with younger intellectuals like
Felix Frankfurter, Laski, and their contemporaries “made possible the channeling of his
passion . . . toward the goals of a resurgent professional ambition. These goals precipitated
judicial contributions that, thanks to the approval of his new friends, eventually secured
Holmes the level of recognition to which he had always aspired.”56
Nevertheless, Holmes continued to feel “apprehension . . . about his friendships with
the younger generation of scholars.”57 Thus, in “one letter to Frankfurter, . . . Holmes
noted his ‘rather fearful hope that I may never fall from the place you have given me,’ and
‘my expectation that always while I live . . . I shall have great cause to be proud of having
counted for something in your life.’” 58 Holmes repeatedly expressed his ambition “to be
admitted the greatest jurist in the world” 59 and “the greatest legal thinker in the world.”60
Given Holmes’s insecurity and lofty ambitions, significant pushback on his spring 1919
speech opinions, from the very group of admirers that he was counting on to carry forward
his legacy, might well have caused him to reconsider his position.61
Finally, one must not underestimate the influence of Justice Louis Brandeis, the
other brilliant mind on what was otherwise a mediocre Supreme Court. It was not merely
that Brandeis courted and, presumably, flattered Holmes; 62 the affinity of two superior
intellects trapped in a small-group environment with arguably lesser intellects should not
be understated. I find it significant that Brandeis joined Holmes’s three spring 1919 speech
opinions, but they both did an about-face that fall in Abrams and worked pretty much in
lock-step in speech cases thereafter. Professor Chafee posited the hypothesis that in the
spring of 1919, Holmes “was biding his time until the Court should have before it a
conviction so clearly wrong as to let him speak out his deepest thoughts about the First
Amendment.”63 I find it more plausible that it was Brandeis who was biding his time:
going along with Holmes in Schenck, Frohwerk, and Debs so as to gain his confidence,

55. Id. at 1472.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id. & n.336 (quoting Letter from Oliver Wendell Holmes to Felix Frankfurter (Mar. 9, 1915) (copy on
file with Tulsa Law Review)).
59. Letter from Oliver Wendell Holmes to Canon Patrick Sheehan (Dec. 15, 1912), in HOLMES-SHEEHAN
CORRESPONDENCE: LETTERS OF JUSTICE OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR. AND CANON PATRICK AUGUSTINE
SHEEHAN 78 (David H. Burton ed.,1976) [hereinafter HOLMES-SHEEHAN CORRESPONDENCE].
60. White, Holmes’s Life Plan, supra note 54, at 1466 (quoting Letter from Oliver Wendell Holmes to Nina
Gray (Dec. 2, 1910) (copy on file with Tulsa Law Review)).
61. See HEALY, supra note 42.
62. I have found no direct evidence that Brandeis flattered Holmes, but there is much flattery in Holmes’s
correspondence with his regular correspondents, such as Frankfurter. See, e.g., Letter from Felix Frankfurter to
Oliver Wendell Holmes (May 29, 1929), available at http://library.law.harvard.edu/suites/owh/index.php/item/4
2879160/10. In this letter, Frankfurter congratulates Holmes on his Schwimmer dissent in extravagant terms: “I
had assumed that you exhausted my capacity for being thrilled by magistral utterance on behalf of sanity in your
Abrams opinion. But you have done it again and anew.” Biographer Liva Baker describes Laski’s side of the
correspondence with Holmes as “a flattering and reverential one, every letter a genuflection.” BAKER, supra note
6, at 488. One would surmise that Brandeis, like Frankfurter and Laski, detected Holmes’s affinity for such
homage and played on it from time to time.
63. ZECHARIAH CHAFEE JR., FREE SPEECH IN THE UNITED STATES 86 (1941).
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then leveraging that trust to help turn the old warhorse around. There is little doubt that
Brandeis eventually came to influence Holmes: Chief Justice Taft sourly complained that
“Holmes was ‘so completely under the control’ of Brandeis that it gave Brandeis two votes
instead of one.”64 Even if Taft was exaggerating, it is not difficult to imagine that a
symbiotic affinity developed between these two great men so that they influenced each
other to forge a bold new path in First Amendment law.
Indeed, that affinity was on display in 1925, when Brandeis signed onto Holmes’s
famous dissent in Gitlow v. New York.65 The Gitlow majority upheld a “criminal anarchy”
conviction for publishing The Left Wing Manifesto in a radical newspaper named The
Revolutionary Age. Holmes dissented, adopting a view of “incitement” that still resonates
today:
It is said that this manifesto was more than a theory, that it was an incitement. Every
idea is an incitement. It offers itself for belief and if believed it is acted on unless
some other belief outweighs it or some failure of energy stifles the movement at its
birth. The only difference between the expression of an opinion and an incitement
in the narrower sense is the speaker’s enthusiasm for the result. Eloquence may set
fire to reason. But whatever may be thought of the redundant discourse before us it
had no chance of starting a present conflagration. If in the long run the beliefs
expressed in proletarian dictatorship are destined to be accepted by the dominant
forces of the community, the only meaning of free speech is that they should be
given their chance and have their way. 66
Holmes had rounded another jurisprudential corner in defense of free speech. He had again
invited danger; he had again flirted with the idea of free speech experiments; and he had
again asked us to place an almost blind faith in his free speech enterprise. In the process,
he became bolder. But just how far would that boldness go? Did Gitlow mark the end of
the experiment or was there something more that needed to be added to the jurisprudential
mix?
SCHWIMMER REDUX
Holmes’s Abrams dissent brought him an avalanche of accolades from the
intellectuals he admired, who then set in motion the process of canonization. 67 In the
acerbic words of a Holmes critic, “[h]is very name became laden, through processes not
completely secular, with connotations of concern for liberty; only with the greatest
difficulty could he from that time on be seen as merely a man.” 68 His collaboration with
Brandeis also continued and strengthened, and the two Justices broke new ground—often

64. WHITE, AMERICAN JUDICIAL TRADITION, supra note 29, at 135 (quoting 2 HENRY F. PRINGLE, THE LIFE
TIMES OF WILLIAM HOWARD TAFT 969 (1939)). “Taft was determined to keep any prospective candidate
who might join Holmes and Brandeis and side with that ‘dangerous twosome’ from being nominated.” PETER G.
RENSTROM, THE TAFT COURT: JUSTICES, RULINGS, AND LEGACY 31 (2003).
65. 268 U.S. 652, 672 (1925) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
66. Id. at 673 (Holmes, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
67. As Professor White notes, “Holmes’ ‘greatness’ was . . . the conscious product of a systematic campaign
of publicity, a campaign in which Holmes participated.” WHITE, LAW AND THE INNER SELF, supra note 6, at
355–56.
68. Rogat & O’Fallon, supra note 27, at 1389.
AND
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in dissents or concurrences—in a series of First Amendment cases.
According to biographer Sheldon Novick, Brandeis urged Holmes to write dissents
in a number of these cases, appealing to Holmes’s “sense of duty. . . . With each dissent
he became more celebrated . . . .”69 One can speculate on the “accidents of history” that
brought together these two men of different “temperaments . . . [and] philosophies.”70
Brandeis, in full vigor of youth, was brilliant and methodical, yet lacked Holmes’s
rhetorical power and reputation. While Holmes was near the end of his career, he could
still turn a memorable phrase and come up with sweeping concepts that fired the
imagination. It is not difficult to accept Novick’s claim that “Brandeis urged Holmes to
write dissents, and Holmes did publish dissenting opinions more often than he would have
. . . .”71
There appears to be little doubt that Holmes wrote his Schwimmer dissent at
Brandeis’s urging:
[Mrs.] Holmes died on April 3, 1929, a few weeks after the oral arguments in
Schwimmer. To help the grieving Holmes, then eighty-eight years old, Justice
Brandeis spoke to his colleague about the Schwimmer case and about freedom of
conscience. Talk of the case and the principle in it were therapeutic for the grieving
jurist, or so Brandeis hoped. Thanks in part to Brandeis, Holmes rallied his energy
and wrote a dissent.72
As previously noted, writing the dissent posed some obstacles for Holmes because
Schwimmer was an alien, and thus had no First Amendment rights, and because Holmes
had to make findings on appeal, contradicting those of the district court. But these
complications were beside the point because Holmes used his dissent to elucidate not so
much a constitutional principle as a theory about the proper relationship between
individuals and their government in a free society. With classic Holmesian terseness, he
cut to the heart of the matter: “Surely it cannot show lack of attachment to the principles
of the Constitution that she thinks that it can be improved. I suppose that most intelligent
people think that it might be.”73 In other words, proposing changes in the way we govern
ourselves is constructive and necessary, and any government that prohibits expressing
such ideas is courting disaster by stifling the process that enables society to adapt to
changing circumstances over time.
Holmes takes pains to distance himself from Schwimmer’s ideas by stating that he
does not share them.74 This is no doubt true, and it eliminates one possibility for his
changed opinion—that he was simply favoring his own point of view. Holmes also points
to groups like the Quakers who hold ideas similar to Schwimmer’s and “have done their
share to make the country what it is” and states that he “had not supposed hitherto that we
regretted our inability to expel them because they believed more than some of us do in the

69.
70.
71.
72.

THE FUNDAMENTAL HOLMES, supra note 23, at 320 (citing NOVICK, supra note 6, at 353).
WHITE, AMERICAN JUDICIAL TRADITION, supra note 29, at 161.
THE FUNDAMENTAL HOLMES, supra note 23, at 320 (citing NOVICK, supra note 6, at 476 n.36).
Id. at 338 (citing LEWIS J. PAPER, BRANDEIS: AN INTIMATE BIOGRAPHY OF ONE OF AMERICA’S TRULY
GREAT SUPREME COURT JUSTICES 326 (1980)).
73. United States v. Schwimmer, 279 U.S. 644, 654 (1929) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
74. Id. (Holmes, J., dissenting).
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teachings of the Sermon on the Mount.” 75 This rhetorical flare reminds readers that
Schwimmer’s ideas are consistent with some understandings of the Christian faith,
countering the notion that Schwimmer’s views are the product of her atheism.
But Holmes then goes a step further and proclaims that there is one “principle of the
Constitution that more imperatively calls for attachment than any other”: “the principle of
free thought—not free thought for those who agree with us but freedom for the thought
that we hate.”76 With this last idea, Holmes announces that there are limits on the power
of government that transcend even those expressly imposed by the Constitution. He, who
so memorably sneered at the idea of substantive due process in Lochner, foreshadowed
the idea of unenumerated rights that the Supreme Court would recognize in a later era.
And indeed, in Girouard v. United States,77 the Court overruled Schwimmer, citing
Holmes’s dissent and using language that endorses his view: “The victory for freedom of
thought recorded in our Bill of Rights recognizes that in the domain of conscience there is
a moral power higher than the State.”78 The pre-Abrams Holmes might have cringed at
this idea, but the Holmes of the Schwimmer dissent would surely have nodded agreement
and perhaps even smiled.
Holmes’s Schwimmer dissent has rightfully been criticized for being “devoid of any
formal statutory analysis” (this was, after all, a case interpreting an immigration statute,
not the Constitution) and for “substitut[ing] [Holmes’s] views about the respondent and
her ideas about the war for any sustained examination for what power Congress had
actually delegated to the Naturalization Board.”79 But such criticisms miss the point:
Holmes was using Schwimmer’s case as a vehicle for explicating the concept he first
posited in his Abrams dissent: “the ultimate good desired is better reached by free trade in
ideas, . . . the best test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the
competition of the market, and . . . truth is the only ground upon which their wishes safely
can be carried out.”80 And, by applying it in a case where the speaker herself had no
constitutional rights, Holmes may well have anticipated another important concept: The
marketplace of ideas involves both speakers and listeners and denying Schwimmer her
right to speak impaired the rights of others who might hear her ideas and benefit from
them. The Supreme Court eventually recognized that principle in Kleindienst v. Mandel 81
when it allowed U.S. citizens to challenge the refusal of a visa to a speaker whose message
they wanted to hear.82
75. Id. (Holmes, J., dissenting). In June 1929, in response to a letter from Laski praising his dissent, Holmes
wrote, “I couldn’t help suspecting that [the majority opinion] was made easier by [Schwimmer’s] somewhat
flamboyant declaration that she was an atheist.” THE FUNDAMENTAL HOLMES, supra note 23, at 337.
76. Schwimmer, 279 U.S. at 654–55 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
77. 328 U.S. 61 (1946).
78. Id. at 68 (emphasis added).
79. THE FUNDAMENTAL HOLMES, supra note 23, at 339.
80. Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
81. 408 U.S. 753 (1972).
82. Although the Court ruled in favor of the government on the substantive claim, it considered the issue on
the merits while recognizing that Mandel, the proposed speaker, “had no constitutional right of entry to this
country as a nonimmigrant or otherwise.” Id. at 762. It thus decided the case on the basis of the right of the
American petitioners to hear Mandel speak. Id. at 762; Id. at 775–76 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (“I am convinced
that Americans cannot be denied the opportunity to hear Dr. Mandel’s views in person because their Government
disapproves of his ideas.”).
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More importantly, there is the story of Holmes’s ability to give birth to an idea,
namely, that we should protect the very speech we abhor – speech that offends us, speech
that aims to uproot the very principles we hold dear. Back then, the idea was bold, so much
so that it was seen more as a rhetorical flourish than as a jurisprudential maxim. But, like
so many other Holmesian ideas, in time it took root. Today, in case after case, it finds
expression in our First Amendment literature, culminating in Justice Alito’s opinion in
Matal v. Tam, which elevates it to “the proudest boast of our free speech jurisprudence.”83
Offensive speech, hate speech, even lies have long received First Amendment
protection.84 But with the Matal ruling, the toleration principle became our “proudest
boast.”
Think of it: In less than 700 words, in his waning years as a Supreme Court Justice,
at an age where most men were long retired, writing in dissent, Holmes managed to give
birth to an idea that the Court eventually parades as an accepted principle—one to boast
about. And perhaps this was his purpose. As Professor White has noted, “Holmes believed
that when he left the Court he would surrender not only the power to work but the power
of place; that he would then be subject to the vicissitudes of fame or obscurity; that others
would determine his fate.”85 Or, as Holmes himself put it in a radio address on the occasion
of his ninetieth birthday:
The riders in a race do not stop short when they reach the goal. There is a little
finishing canter before coming to a standstill. There is time to hear the kind voice
of friends and to say to one’s self: The work is done. But just as one says that, the
answer comes: The race is over, but the work is never done while the power to work
remains. The canter that brings you to a stand still need not be only coming to rest.
It cannot be, while you still live. For to live is to function. That is all there is in
living.86
Holmes’s Schwimmer dissent may have been his way of overcoming his wife’s death by,
himself, continuing to strive, to create, to live. 87

83. 137 S. Ct. 1744, 1764 (2017).
84. See, e.g., De Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353, 365 (1937); R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 403
(1992) (White, J., concurring in judgment); United States v. Alvarez, 567 U.S. 709, 711 (2012).
85. White, Holmes’s Life Plan, supra note 54, at 1474 (emphasis added).
86. Oliver Wendell Holmes, Radio Address to the Nation (Mar. 8, 1931), reproduced in THE FUNDAMENTAL
HOLMES, supra note 23, at 342–43.
87. Fanny Holmes’s death no doubt reminded Holmes of his own mortality. He said as much in his May 30,
1929 letter to Laski: “My wife’s death seems like the beginning of my own.” 2 HOLMES-LASKI LETTERS, supra
note 24, at 1152. Holmes’s drive to “work . . . while the power to work remains” seems to have remained steady,
if not increase, after her death. The day his wife died, in fact, Holmes wrote an opinion and sent it to Chief Justice
Taft. See G. EDWARD WHITE, OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR. 124 (2006). In the aforementioned letter to Laski,
one month after her death, Holmes said, “My wife’s death . . . hasn’t prevented my writing. . . . I have just turned
off a dissent about the refusal to admit a pacifist to citizenship that Brandeis liked and joined in. There seems to
be a distinct compartment in one’s mind that works away no matter what is going on with the rest of the
machinery.” 2 HOLMES-LASKI LETTERS, supra note 24, at 1152. Holmes’s secretary, Chapman Rose, said of
October Term 1931: “[His] attention span had gone without depriving him of the drive that he always had to
finish any unfinished business. So it was getting more difficult to prevent him from really exhausting himself.”
WHITE, supra, at 125. Knowing that, to Holmes, living means functioning, it is unsurprising (and perhaps even
characteristic) that Holmes would not only function—write the dissent—but that he would function grandly—
write a dissent that is impactful decades later and that becomes our proudest boast.
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Justice Holmes received a good dollop of praise for his Schwimmer dissent.88 In a
letter to Laski in August 1929, Holmes reports: “I still get letters from lonely enthusiasts
who shout over my dissent in the case of a dame who was not allowed to become a citizen
because she was a pacifist.”89 In a typically curmudgeonly fashion, Holmes adds: “I told
one of them that it was moral sympathy not legal judgment that led to his encomiums.” 90
Despite his protestations, Holmes no doubt enjoyed his fan mail immensely. One can
imagine no worse fate for Holmes than descending into obscurity.
Among his letter writers was Rosika Schwimmer herself. On January 28, 1930, she
sent a two-page handwritten letter thanking Holmes for giving her hope, despite the
unhappy outcome in her case. She stated that she had been advised, “You don’t thank
judges,” but felt she had to write because she “carried [her] unexpressed gratitude as a
moral debt.”91 Holmes responded in a letter dated just two days later. He first chastises
her for writing to thank him and explains that “[a] case is simply a problem to be solved,
although the considerations are more complex than those of mathematics.” 92 However, he
finishes on a warm note: “After which protestation, I must add that of course I am gratified
by your more than kind expression, and that I thank you.” 93 There ensued a
correspondence between them that lasted, as best the record reflects, until 1934, the year
before Holmes’s death.
Because only two letters from Holmes and three letters and a telegram from
Schwimmer appear to have survived, 94 it is difficult to tell the nature of their
correspondence. Schwimmer seems to have written Holmes on various occasions, such as
his birthday and retirement from the Court, but there are no known responses from Holmes.
He did write a second letter to Schwimmer, acknowledging a gift of books and expressing
delight:
I become a child again on reading them and sentimental tears drop from my eyes
as I follow the boy chasing the rainbow or the youth of the other boys who followed
the rainbow music. The law also is a rainbow, but to older eyes, and you have made

88. For example, noted New York lawyer (and later Congressman) Frederic R. Coudert wrote to Holmes:
“The result in such cases as that of Madam Schwimmer inclines one to pessimism . . . , but utterances such as
your dissent in that case may save liberalism from becoming completely obsolete, and ultra-nationalism and other
forms of fanatical conformity from becoming wholly dominant.” Letter from Frederic R. Coudert to Oliver
Wendell Holmes (June 20, 1929), available at https://iiif.lib.harvard.edu/manifests/view/drs:36699707$56.i.
89. Letter from Oliver Wendell Holmes to Harold J. Laski (Aug. 23, 1929), in 2 HOLMES-LASKI LETTERS,
supra note 24, at 1177.
90. Id.
91. Letter from Rosika Schwimmer to Oliver Wendell Holmes 2 (Jan. 28, 1930), available at
https://iiif.lib.harvard.edu/manifests/view/drs:37509894$7i.
92. Letter from Oliver Wendell Holmes to Rosika Schwimmer (Jan. 30, 1930), available at
https://iiif.lib.harvard.edu/manifests/view/drs:43026636$2i.
93. Id.
94. See, e.g., Letter from Mark DeWolfe Howe to Edith Wynner (Oct. 3, 1955), available at
http://library.law.harvard.edu/suites/owh/index.php/item/43026636/8 (explaining that “Holmes made it his
general practice to destroy his incoming mail” and therefore the only letters available were the two from Holmes
and the three from Schwimmer, plus a telegram). See also Letter from Mark DeWolfe Howe to Edith Wynner
(Oct. 11, 1955), available at http://library.law.harvard.edu/suites/owh/index.php/item/43026636/6 (refusing
Wynner access to search for further letters). I have, myself, been able to locate no others.
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me forget it.95
Many of Holmes’s commentators and biographers have alluded to his detached,
almost cold, personality. In Professor White’s words: “[H]e gave so little of himself to the
persons around him.”96 And, as Holmes explained in his letter to Schwimmer, he viewed
cases as problems to be solved, without regard to the litigants whose lives would be
dramatically impacted by his decision. But did this detached attitude hold true in
Schwimmer’s case? As noted, Mrs. Holmes died after the case was argued and while
Holmes was contemplating whether to dissent. There is little doubt that the loss of his wife
hit Holmes hard; she was the one remaining person in his life to whom he showed warmth
and devotion. In a 1910 letter to Canon Patrick Sheehan he waxed lyrical: “[M]y wife has
made my whole life a path of beauty. She . . . has devoted all her powers to surrounding
me with enchantments.”97 After her death, Holmes made regular visits to her grave at
Arlington National Cemetery, “[u]sually a single flower, a rose, a spray of honeysuckle or
perhaps a glowing poppy . . . in his hand.”98
Did Holmes’s grief over the loss of his wife—a personal loss and a pointed reminder
of his own mortality—soften him? Perhaps. But as his Abrams and Gitlow dissents reveal,
he had already begun his tilt toward a free-speech-friendly mindset, one that found its final
expression in his Schwimmer dissent.
One wonders whether among his reasons for writing the Schwimmer dissent might
have been to send a ray of hope and solace to the immigrant he knew would be devastated
when she learned that she was rejected by her chosen country. There are hints in Holmes’s
dissent that this may have been the case. He refers to her as “a woman of superior character
and intelligence, obviously more than ordinarily desirable as a citizen of the United
States.”99 He called her an “optimist” and “sincere” and referred to her testimony as
making “a better argument for her admission than any that I can offer.” 100 Perhaps he was
sending Rosika Schwimmer a message: “Don’t despair, Madam. I, the greatest legal
thinker in the world, consider you worthy of being my fellow citizen!”
Again, perhaps. If so, then Justice Holmes had, indeed, traveled very far from the
detached cynic that he prided himself on being for most of his long judicial career. It could
be that, for a brief moment, he descended from Olympus.

95. Letter from Oliver Wendell Holmes to Rosika Schwimmer (Feb. 5, 1939), available at
https://iiif.lib.harvard.edu/manifests/view/drs:43026636$4i.
96. WHITE, LAW AND THE INNER SELF, supra note 6, at 411. See also ALSCHULER, supra note 5, at 31–37
(gathering sources).
97. Letter from Oliver Wendell Holmes to Canon Patrick Sheehan (Aug. 14, 1910), in HOLMES-SHEEHAN
CORRESPONDENCE, supra note 59, at 32.
98. THE FUNDAMENTAL HOLMES, supra note 23, at 345 (quoting The Poe Sisters, WASH. POST, Jan. 27,
1935, at A12).
99. United States v. Schwimmer, 279 U.S. 644, 653 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
100. Id. at 654 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
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